Nonlinear Income Effects in Random Utility Models by Herriges, Joseph A. & Kling, Catherine L.
Economics Publications Economics
2-1999
Nonlinear Income Effects in Random Utility
Models
Joseph A. Herriges
Iowa State University
Catherine L. Kling
Iowa State University, ckling@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, Income Distribution Commons, and the Other
Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/16. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Iowa State University. For more information, please
contact digirep@iastate.edu.
NONLINEAR INCOME EFFECTS IN RANDOM UTILITY MODELS
Joseph A. Herriges and Catherine L. Kling*
Abstract—Random utility models (RUMs) are used in the literature to
model consumer choices from among a discrete set of alternatives, and
they typically impose a constant marginal utility of income on individual
preferences. This assumption is driven partially by the difficulty of
constructing welfare estimates in models with nonlinear income effects.
Recently, McFadden (1995) developed an algorithm for computing these
welfare impacts using a Monte Carlo Markov chain simulator for
generalized extreme-value variates. This paper investigates the empirical
consequences of nonlinear RUMs in the case of sportfishing modal choice,
while refining and contrasting the available methods for welfare estima-
tion.
I. Introduction
The constant marginal utility of income is viewed in mostmicroeconomic applications to be a restrictive, special
case of the more plausible scenario in which marginal
utilities vary with respect to both prices and incomes. Yet, in
the context of modeling discrete choices made by consumers
(e.g., the selection of travel mode or which recreation site to
visit), analysts have relied almost exclusively on random
utility models (RUMs) that are linear in income, directly
imposing a constant marginal utility of income.1 This
assumption is common even in cases in which the estimation
of welfare measures is the primary goal of the empirical
work where nonlinear income effects are likely to be
important (e.g., Just et al., 1982).
The imposition of linear income effects has been accepted
in part because of the inconvenience of estimating nonlinear
models, but more importantly because of the difficulty of
computing welfare estimates under these circumstances.2 In
fact, methods for computing welfare estimates using nested-
logit models that allow for nonlinear income effects have
only recently been devised (McFadden, 1995) and have not
previously been implemented using actual data. Unfortu-
nately for the practitioner, the procedures outlined by
McFadden are computationally intensive, requiring repeated
draws from a random sampler for the generalized extreme-
value (GEV) distribution and an iterative algorithm to
implicitly solve for individual welfare impacts. As an
alternative, McFadden derives theoretical bounds on these
welfare impacts that are computationally simpler than
computing point estimates and which, for some applications,
may provide sufficient information for policymakers. These
recent developments raise the empirical question as to
whether nonlinear income effects are important in practice
and worth the additional computational burdens that they
entail.
The purpose of this paper is both to investigate the
empirical consequences of nonlinear income effects in
RUMs and to extend and refine the available methods for
obtaining welfare estimates in this context. We begin, in
section II by reviewing the basic theory of welfare measure-
ment in RUMs, including results specific to the standard
linear model. Section III then identifies the three alternative
approaches to computing welfare measures (once nonlinear
income effects are permitted) and discusses the merits of
each. We first review McFadden’s algorithm for computing
willingness to pay in a nested logit model with nonlinear
income effects and discuss some technical issues related to
his proposed resampling scheme. Second, we discuss the
alternative of computing welfare measures based upon a
representative consumer. This is the approach employed by
Morey et al. (1993) and Shaw and Ozog (1997). Third, we
consider in detail the suggestion by McFadden (1995) that
bounds alone be computed on the welfare measures of
interest. Specifically, we present a modification to his
algorithm that increases its accuracy, provide an empirically
tractable method for implementing his bounds when there
are nonlinear income effects, and identify scenarios in which
the welfare bounds are uninformative.
The empirical portion of this work, beginning with
sections IV and V, is aimed at carefully comparing and
contrasting the three alternative strategies for estimating
welfare from RUMs. Data from the 1989 Southern Califor-
nia Sportsfishing Survey are used to estimate models of
recreational angling that are nonlinear in both income and
other arguments of the indirect utility function. Both Gener-
alized Leontief and Translog functional forms are used in
modeling the deterministic portion of the utility function.
This use of flexible functional forms to approximate the
indirect utility function in a RUM is apparently novel. The
results are compared to measures constructed from linear
models. In addition, several maintained hypotheses about
the underlying error distribution are employed, including the
extreme-value (EV) and several generalized extreme-value
(GEV) distributions.
In section IV of the paper, the estimated models are used
to construct welfare estimates for changes in the price of
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1 Important exceptions are the papers by Morey et al. (1993) and Shaw
and Ozog (1997) on recreation demand and Gertler and Glewwe (1990)
modeling the demand for schooling.
2 Another consequence of assuming a constant marginal utility of
income, as noted by McFadden (1995, p. 10), is that it is then ‘‘possible to
aggregate preferences into a social preference that generates the market
demand functions using Roy’s Identity.’’ See Chipman and Moore (1980,
1990).
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angling, for changes in angling quality, and for the elimina-
tion of entire angling sites (due perhaps to the closure of a
fishery). We follow each of the strategies for the welfare
measurement just identified, obtaining both point estimates
for the welfare changes and confidence bounds around these
estimates. The final section is used to summarize our
findings.
II. The Theory of Welfare Measurement in RUM
and the Linear Model
The basic theory and structure of discrete-choice RUMs
were developed by McFadden (1973, 1974, 1981), Domen-
cich and McFadden (1975), and Diamond and McFadden
(1974) to analyze consumer selections from among a set of
discrete alternatives and to measure the welfare implications
of changes to the available choice set. Early applications
focused on transportation choices (e.g., Domencich &
McFadden, 1975; Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985), though
subsequent studies have used this modeling framework to
consider issues in education (Gertler & Glewwe, 1990),
housing demand (Bo¨rsch-Supan, 1987), and energy conser-
vation (Cameron, 1985). More recently, there has been
considerable interest in applying RUMs to recreational
choices with the primary purpose of computing the welfare
implications of changing environmental quality or the loss
of access to a recreation area (due, for example, to an oil spill
or other environmental disaster) (e.g., Yen & Adamowicz,
1994; Hausman et al., 1995; Morey et al., 1993).
In discrete-choice models, the utility that an individual
consumer associates with a particular alternative j ( j 5 1,
. . . , J ) is assumed to take the form: Uj 5 U(z, q j, ej), where
z is the amount of a numeraire good consumed by the
individual, qj is a vector of characteristics associated with
alternative j, and ej denotes heterogeneity in consumer
preferences and unobserved factors associated with alterna-
tive j.3 The consumer is assumed to choose that alternative
yielding the highest utility subject to meeting his/her budget
constraint; i.e., y 5 pj 1 z for the selected alternative, where
pj denotes the price of alternative j. Imposing the budget
constraint yields the conditional indirect utility functions:4
Uj 5 U(y 2 pj, qj, ej), j 5 1, . . . , J. (1)
The consumer’s problem is then to select the alternative that
yields the highest utility.
Using equation (1), the probability of choosing alternative
j can be written as
Pj(y, p, q, e) 5 Prob [U(y 2 pj, qj, ej)
$ U(y 2 pk, qk, ek) ; k Þ j],
(2)
where p 5 ( p1, . . . , pJ)8 and q 5 (q81, . . . , q8J)8. The exact
form that these choice probabilities will take depends on the
assumed underlying distribution for e 5 (e1, . . . , eJ)8. If the
ej’s are i.i.d. variates drawn from an EV distribution, then the
familiar multinomial specification results, whereas if e is
drawn from a GEV distribution then the nested-logit model
results.
As noted above, RUMs are often estimated with the goal
of measuring the welfare implications of changing the
choice set, either the set of alternatives themselves or
characteristics of the available alternatives. The compensat-
ing variation (cv) for such changes can be implicitly defined
by5
Max
j[J0
U(y2 pj0, qj0, ej) 5 Max
j[J1
U(y 2 pj1 2 cv, q j1, ej), (3)
where J denotes the choice set and the superscripts ‘‘0’’ and
‘‘1’’ are respectively used to distinguish the original versus
the new conditions that are associated with the choice set.
The resulting compensating variation is a random variable
with the general form:
cv 5 cv(y, p0, q0, p1, q1, e). (4)
It is the expected value of this random variable that is
typically of interest for policy purposes.6 Unfortunately,
there is no general closed-form solution for E(cv), since cv
can depend upon the ej’s in a nonlinear fashion. The standard
approach in the literature is to resolve this problem by
making the following set of assumptions:
A.1 Additive disturbances; i.e., Uj 5 V( y 2 pj, qj) 1 ej,
A.2 GEV disturbances, and
A.3 Constant Marginal Utility of Income; i.e., V( y 2 pj,
qj) 5 a( y 2 pj) 1 f (q j).
It can be shown that under these conditions a closed-form
solution exists for E(cv), one which is independent of
income (e.g., Hanemann, 1982; Small & Rosen, 1981;
Morey, 1998; McFadden, 1995). While the first two assump-
tions may be of concern in some applications, the focus in
this paper is on relaxing assumption A.3.
III. Relaxing the Linearity Assumption: Implications
for Welfare Measurement
The difficulties with relaxing the assumption of linear
income effects appear in the computation of welfare mea-
sures. One can no longer rely on a closed-form solution to
compute welfare. If one wishes to allow nonlinear income
3 Although we assume that the consumer is constrained to choose a single
unit of the discrete good, the model can be generalized to allow multiple
units.
4 The indirect utility function is ‘‘conditional’’ on the choice of alterna-
tive j.
5 As equation (3) implies, we are assuming that e0 5 e1 (i.e., that the
preference heterogeneity is invariant with respect to the policy scenario).
As McFadden (1995, p. 4) notes, without this assumption the welfare
impact of policy changes would no longer be well defined and identifiable.
6 Of course, depending on the application, the analyst may be interested
in other moments of the distribution of compensating variations.
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effects, there are currently three alternative approaches from
which to choose.7 The first alternative requires resampling
from the underlying error distribution and employing a
numerical algorithm to solve for the implicitly defined
compensation variation. The second is to adopt a representa-
tive consumer strategy and compute the welfare for this
consumer. The third approach is to employ McFadden’s
bounds on the welfare estimates as applied to models with
nonlinear income effects. We discuss each option in turn
below.
A. Alternative 1: Simulation
The compensating variation defined in equation (3) is an
implicit function of the characteristics of the choice set and
distribution of preferences in the population, as captured by
the functional form of U(·) and distributions of both ( y, p, q)
and the ej’s. Suppose U(·) has been specified to be nonlinear
in income, and econometric estimates of the parameters
have been obtained for a given data set. One approach to
computing an estimate of E(cv) is to begin with the
simulation procedure suggested in McFadden (1995). The
procedure is best understood as a series of steps, conducted
first for each observation in the sample:
Step 1: At iteration t (t 5 1, . . . , T), a pseudorandom
number generator is used to draw the vector eˆ t
from the estimated distribution of e.
Step 2: A numerical routine is then used to search
iteratively for the cvt implicitly defined by8
Max
j[J0
U(y2 pj0, qj0, eˆjt)
5 Max
j[J1
U(y 2 pj1 2 cvt, qj1, eˆjt).
(5)
Step 3: The mean of the cv t over the T iterations provides
a consistent estimate of E(cv 0y, p0, q0, p1, q1);
i.e., the mean value of cv for individuals with the
set of observed characteristics ( y, p0, q0, p1, q1).
The resulting collection of cv t’s likewise provides
a simulated distribution of cv for individuals with
the same set of observed characteristics.
If the sample available to the analyst is representative of the
target population, these three steps can be repeated for each
observation and averaged to obtain an estimate of E(cv) for
the population. Otherwise, a weighted average may be
needed to correct for differences between the sample and
target populations.
This procedure, while conceptually simple, requires the
ability to resample from the assumed error distribution used
to estimate the model. In this regard, two appealing choices
for the distribution of e are the extreme value and multivari-
ate normal distributions, as pseudorandom number genera-
tors are easy to devise in these cases. However, the EV
distribution yields the multinomial logit specification, which
is known to suffer from the much discussed and maligned
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. If
one is attempting to generalize the RUM by incorporating
nonlinear income effects, it is not likely to be desirable to
impose such a restrictive assumption on the disturbance
terms. The multivariate normal probit (MNP) model, while
certainly less restrictive than the multinomial logit model, is
problematic for a different reason. Although recent advances
in econometrics suggest that the MNP model may be
feasible to estimate (e.g., McFadden, 1989; Bo¨rsch-Supan &
Hajivassiliou, 1993), the computational burdens of obtain-
ing parameter estimates for such models remains substantial.
The most common distributional assumption employed
with RUMs is that the errors, e, are drawn from a GEV
distribution, resulting in the nested-logit model. This specifi-
cation yields choice probability equations that are easy to
construct (thus simplifying estimation) without imposing the
IIA assumption that haunts the multinomial logit model.
However, approximating a sample from a GEV distribution
is not a trivial exercise. In fact, only recently has McFadden
(1995) developed a Monte Carlo Markov chain method for
constructing a sequence of random vectors, eˆ8, whose
empirical distribution asymptotically approximates a GEV
cumulative distribution. The approach to constructing an
estimate of E(cv) is the same as above, except that Step 1 is
replaced with the following GEV sampler routine:
Step 1A: At iteration t(t 5 1, . . . , T), a pseudorandom
number generator is used to draw J 1 l
independent (0, 1) uniform random variables,
z j
t ( j 5 1, . . . , J) and ht. J extreme value
random variates are then formed using the
transformation e˜jt 5 2log (2log (z lt)). Finally,
the following Markov chain is used to con-
struct:
eˆt 5 5 e˜t if ht #
f(e˜t) /g(e˜t)
f(eˆt21) /g(eˆt21)
eˆt21 otherwise
,
(6)
where f(·) and g(·) denote the GEV and EV
probability density functions, respectively.
The right-hand side of the inequality term in equation (6) can
be interpreted loosely by noting that f(·)/g(·) corresponds to
the weights used in importance sampling (e.g., Geweke,
1989). Thus, the Markov chain replaces an earlier draw if the
new draw has greater weight than the previous observation
in the chain. McFadden (1995) proves that the mean
7 Shonkwiler and Shaw (1997) have recently suggested a fourth alterna-
tive, using a finite-mixture model to estimate consumer preferences that is
piecewise linear in income.
8 In our application below, numerical bisection was used to solve for cv8.
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compensating variation computed using Steps 1A, B, and C
converges almost surely to E(cv) as T = `.
Several potential difficulties are associated with the
simulation estimator outlined above. First, the procedure is
computationally intensive. As McFadden (1995) demon-
strates in a Monte Carlo experiment, the number of iterations
(T) required to achieve a given level of precision increases
substantially as the GEV model departs from the EV
distribution. In his experiment, the number of iterations
required to obtain a 5% root mean squared error ranges from
755 (when e is EV) to nearly 19,000 as the dissimilarity
coefficient becomes 0.1.9 The computational burden is all
the more severe when it is recognized that the parameters
underlying these cv calculations are themselves estimates. If
confidence bounds on E(cv) are to be constructed recogniz-
ing the uncertainty of these estimates, the three-step simula-
tion procedure will need to be repeated for a series of draws
from the distribution of the estimated parameters.10
Finally, Step 2 of the simulation process assumes that cv8
exists that implicitly solves equation (5). This need not be
the case when a model with nonlinear income effects is used
to approximate underlying preferences. The problem is akin
to the difficulties found in continuous-demand systems,
when estimated models yield preferences that are locally
consistent with utility theory, but fail to have well-behaved
global properties. In the current problem (while estimated
nonlinear models may yield a positive marginal utility of
income at the mean of the sample), the marginal utility of
income can become negative at extremes of the sample or
when substantial price or quality changes are considered. In
these cases, there may not exist a cv8 that solves equation (5).
B. Alternative 2: A Representative Consumer Approach
A second approach is to approximate E(cv) by computing
the income compensation required to equate expected utility
before and after a given price and/or quality change. This is
the approach suggested and implemented by Morey et al.
(1993). Formally, this corresponds to calculating the cv
implicitly defined by
E 3Maxj[J0 U(y 2 pj0, qj0, ej)4
5 E 3Maxj[J1 U(y 2 pj1 2 cv, qj1, ej)4.
(7)
Under this alternative, the expected utility function is
interpreted as the utility function of a representative con-
sumer. When preferences satisfy assumptions A.1 and A.2 of
the previous section (i.e., e enters preferences additively and
is assumed to be drawn from a GEV distribution), the
expected utilities on the left and right sides of equation (7)
are closed-form functions of the V( y 2 pj0, qj0)’s and V( y 2
pj
1 2 cv, qj1)’s, respectively.11 An iterative procedure can
then be employed to solve this implicit equation without the
resampling step that is required under the simulation ap-
proach. The appeal of this alternative is that it is simple to
implement, while still allowing the analyst to relax the
constant marginal utility of income assumption (i.e., A.3).
However, McFadden (1995) notes that cv will generally be a
biased estimator of mean compensating variation and, in his
Monte Carlo results, finds that the percentage bias from
using this approach increases as the size of the welfare
change increases.12 We include estimates based upon this
approach in our empirical section below in order to investi-
gate the extent of the bias in an applied setting.13
C. Alternative 3: Theoretical Bounds
Recognizing the computational difficulty of the GEV
simulation approach, McFadden (1995) suggests that it may
be easier to bound the welfare impacts of a policy change
and that, for some applications, these bounds may provide
sufficient information to decision makers. Towards this end,
he proposes theoretical bounds on E(cv). In particular, let
cvjk denote the income reduction that is required to equate
the utility from consuming alternative, j, before the quality/
price change with the utility from consuming alternative, k,
after the change, i.e., cvjk is implicitly defined by
U(y 2 pj0, qj0, ej) 5 U(y 2 pk1 2 cvjk, qk1, ek) ;j, k. (8)
The cvjk’s can be viewed as conditional compensating
variations, as they are defined as conditional on the event
(Bik) that the individual selects alternative j prior to the
attribute changes and selects alternative k after these changes
and compensation cv. McFadden demonstrates that, given
the event Bjk, these conditional compensating variations
bound the true cv, with14
cvjj # cv(y, p0, q0, p1, q1, e) # cvkk. (9)
9 The dissimilarity coefficient, denoted u below, corresponds to the
inverse of McFadden’s (1995) ‘‘s’’.
10 A procedure for constructing confidence bounds on the mean compen-
sating variation estimates is outlined in section VI.
11 The exact form of the expected utility function depends upon the
nesting structure assumed in the GEV distribution and are excluded here
for the sake of space. See, for example, Morey (1998) for detailed
expressions.
12 Hanemann (1996) makes a similar observation.
13 A second rationale for considering this representative-consumer ap-
proach emerges if one considers the e’s as capturing individual uncertainty
rather than heterogeneity of preferences across individuals. In this
situation, equation (7) reflects the compensation calculation that would be
undertaken by a risk-neutral individual. This line of reasoning parallels the
arguments put forth by Bockstael and Strand (1987) in the context of
continuous-demand systems.
14 McFadden provides the intuition for this result by noting that, if the
consumer can move from the previously chosen alternative after a
quality/price change, then the compensation needed to maintain the
original level of utility may well be smaller than it would be if forced to
stay with the original choice. Likewise, the flexibility of having chosen
another alternative prior to the price/quality change means that the
consumer might need a smaller compensation than the one needed if they
are forced to the finally chosen alternative.
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Taking expectations of this inequality yields McFadden’s
theoretical bounds on E(cv), with
o
j[J 0
Pj
0(y, p0, q0)cvjj # E(cv)
# o
k[J 1
Pk
1(y 2 cv, p1, q1)cvkk,
(10)
where
Pj
0(y, p0, q0) 5 Prob[U(y 2 pj0, qj0, ej)
$ U(y 2 pk0, qk0, ek) ; k Þ j]
(11)
denotes the choice probabilities prior to the attribute changes,
and
Pj
1(y 2 cv, p1, q1)
5 Prob[U(y 2 pj12cv, qj1, ej)
$U( y 2 pk1 2 cv, qk1, ek); k Þ j]
(12)
denotes the choice probabilities after the attribute changes
and compensation cv. The key to employing the welfare
bounds in equation (10) is to note that, when the error terms
are assumed to enter the utility function in an additive
manner (as is typically the case), then the cvij’s are depen-
dent of the error distribution and need not be simulated.
Given estimates of the choice probabilities in equation (11)
and (12), the computational burden of simulating GEV
errors can then be avoided entirely.
A number of issues arise in constructing the theoretical
bounds detailed in equation (10). First, while the initial
choice probabilities (i.e., Pj0( y, p0, q0)) follow directly from
the estimated model, the new choice probabilities
Pj
1( y 2 cv, p1, q1) depend upon the unknown compensating
variation, cv.15 Thus, the upper theoretical bound in equation
(10) cannot be directly computed. One approach would be to
approximate cv using a linear model (in which case cv has a
closed-form solution) and to use this approximation in
computing the upper bound choice probabilities. However,
the resulting bounds are no longer guaranteed to truly bound
E(cv). Alternatively, the theoretical bounds can be simulated
just as E(cv) can be simulated. In particular, a consistent
estimate of Pj1( y 2 cv, p1, q1) can be obtained using
McFadden’s GEV simulator, which provides a consistent
estimator of any real-valued function that is integrable with
respect to the distribution function of e. In this case, that
real-valued function is an indicator function for the selected
alternative, given the new alternative characteristics and the
implicitly solved for cv. Of course, in practice, practitioners
would not bother with the theoretical bounds once they had
available point estimates of the compensating variation
itself.
A third approach to constructing the theoretical bounds is
to note that equation (9) implies that
cvL ; Min
j
cvjj #cv(y, p0, p1, q1, e)
# cvH ; Max
j
cvjj.
(13)
Using this result, we can bound the new choice probabilities,
since
Pj
1(y 2 cv, p1, q1) 5 Prob[U(y 2 pj1 2 cv, q j1, ej)
$ U(y 2 pk1 2 cv, qk1, ek) ; k Þ j]
# Prob[U(y 2 pj1 2 cvL, qj1, ej)
$ U(y 2 pk1 2 cvH, qk1, ek) ; k Þ j]
;P˜ j
1(y, cvL, cvH, p1, q1).
(14)
Notice that while
o
j[J8
P˜ j
1 $1,
it need not sum exactly to unity. Substituting the results of
equation (14) into equation (10) yields the following comput-
able bounds on E(cv):16
o
j[J0
Pj
0(y, p0, q0) cvjj # E(cv)
# o
k[J1
P˜ k
1(y, cvL, cvH, p1, q1) cvkk.
(15)
A second issue in the computation of the theoretical
bounds is how best to estimate the cvjj terms. McFadden
suggests that the equivalent of a linear approximation be
employed. This entails computing the difference in utility
before and after the quality/price change and dividing by an
intermediate value of the marginal utility of income over this
change. The accuracy of this approximation is an empirical
question, but it will undoubtedly decrease as the size of the
welfare change increases. However, an exact calculation of
the cvjj can be recovered by applying a standard numerical
routine (such as numerical bisection) to equation (8).
A third issue regarding these bounds is the type of welfare
changes to which they can be meaningfully applied. McFad-
den writes the bounds in terms of quality changes, corre-
sponding to changes in the level of the q’s. We have
generalized these in our formulations to consider changes in
the prices as well. This is a minor extension, in and of itself,
15 McFadden notes this point, but does not elaborate on it nor suggest a
solution.
16 Note that the computable lower bound and McFadden’s theoretical
lower bound are the same.
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except that it highlights a case in which the bounds will be
uninformative. Specifically, if the analyst is interested in
computing a welfare change associated with the elimination
of one or more alternatives (due, perhaps, to toxic contami-
nation of several fishing sites or a large oil spill affecting
recreation areas), the application of the bounds can be
equivalent to considering a price change from its current
level to an infinite price for the lost alternatives. For these
alternatives, however, cvjj is negative and infinite, since
there is no finite level of compensation that can make the
consumer as well off with an infinite price compared to the
initial finite price, if they are unable to switch to another
alternative. Thus, the (absolute value of) the lower bound is
infinite. Likewise, the upper bound is zero since it depends
on only the alternatives that remain after the site closings,
and there is no change in the remaining alternatives’ prices
and/or qualities. In fact, recovery of welfare estimates
associated with the entire elimination of one or more
alternatives is a common goal of empirical analysis. In these
instances, the theoretical bounds will provide no information
to policymakers.
A final point concerning the empirical relevance of
theoretical bounds in equation (10) and (14) is the recogni-
tion that these bounds will need to be computed using
parameter estimates, and, as such, will themselves be
random variables. Confidence intervals on the theoretical
bounds can be computed using simulation techniques. Thus,
even if the point estimates of the bounds are fairly tight, the
width of the bounds when their statistical imprecision is
accounted for may be wider than an analyst is comfortable
with.
IV Data
The data used in our application were drawn from the
Southern California Sportfishing Recreation Survey con-
ducted in 1989. A complete description of the data can be
found in Thomson and Crooke (1991) and Kling and
Thomson (1996). Random telephone interviews were con-
ducted in Southern California to identify recreational an-
glers, who were then requested to complete a follow-up mail
questionnaire. Respondents provided a variety of informa-
tion about their angling experiences including extensive
information on their most recent saltwater fishing trip. This
data included the month of their fishing trip, the species they
targeted, the time it took to travel to and from the fishing site,
the travel distance, and other expenditures associated with
the trip. In addition, they reported whether they fished from
the beach, a pier, a private boat, or a charter boat. These four
alternatives constitute the possible modes of fishing from
which anglers choose in our empirical models.
Respondents also reported their annual income and their
household’s ZIP code. The ZIP code data were used to
compute roundtrip travel costs to their most recently visited
fishing site. An opportunity cost of travel time (based on
their reported wage rate) and any boat fees or fuel costs were
added to these roundtrip costs to construct the final variable
for the price of fishing.
Since the anticipated success of fishing is likely to be an
important determinant of the decision to engage in angling
as well as the choice of which mode of fishing to select, we
include catch rates as an explanatory variable. Specifically,
exogenous data on catch rates were provided by the Marine
Recreational Fishery Statistics Survey, which is sponsored
annually by the National Marine Fisheries Service. These
catch rates are defined on a per-hour-fished basis for each
major species by fishing mode. In the mail survey, anglers
were questioned as to their targeted species. A catch rate
variable was then constructed by summing the per hour
catch rates associated with each angler’s targeted species.
Since these data were collected independently from the mail
survey, the catch rate associated with each mode is exog-
enous to the angler. A total of 1,182 observations with
complete data on income, prices, and catch rates were
available for use in our analysis.
V. Model Specification
Our application focuses on modeling the mode choice
(i.e., beach, pier, private boat, or charter boat) of recreational
saltwater anglers. The model specification involves assump-
tions regarding the functional form of the indirect utility and
the distribution of preferences in the population. We begin
by using the standard assumption in the literature (A.1
above) that the error terms enter the indirect utility function
additively; i.e.,
Uj5 V(y 2 pj, q j) 1 ej, (16)
where y is now defined as monthly income.
Three alternative functional forms are considered for the
deterministic portion of the indirect utility function V(y 2 pj,
qj). To provide a basis of comparison, we begin by
estimating the parameters of a simple, linear, indirect utility
functional form. We also estimate Generalized Leontief
(GL) and Translog (TL) models. Thus, the three specifica-
tions considered for the deterministic portion of the indirect
utility function are
x Linear:
Vj(y 2 pj, qj) 5 b11(y 2 pj) 1 b22(qj) (17)
j Generalized Leontief (GL):
Vj(y 2 pj, qj) 5 b10(y 2 pj)1/2 1 b20qj1/2
1 b11(y 2 pj) 1 b22qj
1 b12(y 2 pj)1/2qj1/2
(18)
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x Translog (TL)
Vj(y 2 pj, qj) 5 b10 ln(y 2 pj) 1 b20 ln(qj)
1 b11ln(y 2 pj)2 1 b22 ln(qj)2
1 b12ln(y 2 pj) ln(qj),
(19)
where qj denotes the catch rate at site j. Notice that the linear
specification represents a constrained version of the GL
model, with b10 5 b20 5 b12 5 0.
In addition to identifying the functional form for V(·), the
model specification requires distributional assumptions re-
garding e. We estimate each model under three assumptions
for the distribution of preferences (captured by e): an
extreme value distribution and two GEV distributions corre-
sponding to two different correlation patterns among the
alternatives. The extreme value assumption yields the multi-
nomial logit (MNL) model, whereas the GEV assumptions
yield alternative nested-logit models, with different nesting
structures. The first GEV distribution groups pier, beach, and
private boat into a single nest (assuming greater substitution
possibilities among these three alternatives than between
any one of these and charter boating). This is referred to as
the ‘‘charter’’ model. A second GEV distribution is investi-
gated wherein pier, beach, and charter boat enter a single
nest and private boat is in its own nest. This is referred to as
the ‘‘private’’ model. The tree structures typically presented
for the nested-logit models corresponding to these two
correlation patterns, along with the MNL model, are pro-
vided in figure 1.17
VI. Results
A. Parameter Estimates
Table 1 contains the parameter estimates from the linear,
GL, and TL functional forms. Coefficient estimates for each
these models are reported using the three nesting structures:
the MNL model, the nested-logit charter model, and the
nested-logit private model. While our primary interest is
with the welfare predictions implied by each of these
models, several useful insights emerge from table 1.
Focusing first on the coefficients that are associated with
the deterministic portion of the indirect utility function (i.e.,
the bij’s), we see that most of these parameter estimates
differ significantly from zero using either a 1% or 5%
significance level. While interpreting the bij’s directly in the
nonlinear models is difficult, b11 and b22 have natural
interpretations for the linear models. The coefficient b11
corresponds to marginal utility of income and, as expected,
is estimated to be positive, ranging between 0.01 and 0.02.
Similarly, b22 indicates the marginal utility of catch rate (as a
quality attribute of fishing mode) and is also estimated to be
positive, ranging from 0.41 to 0.95. While these marginal
utilities are nonlinear functions in the GL and TL models,
their estimates at the sample means were found to corre-
spond closely to those predicted by the linear specification.
The other parameter estimate presented in table 1 is the
dissimilarity coefficient u. The dissimilarity coefficient indi-
cates the degree of correlation among alternatives within a
nest of the assumed nesting structure. A well-known condi-
tion for consistency of a RUM model with stochastic utility
maximization is that u lies within the unit interval (Daly &
Zachary, 1979; McFadden, 1978). When u 5 1, the alterna-
tives are uncorrelated and the multinomial logit specification
results. On the other hand, as u declines towards zero,
alternatives within a nest become increasingly closer substi-
tutes. Thus, one test of the multinomial logit specification
(and the implied independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumption) is whether the parameter u differs significantly
from 1. Clearly, the multinomial logit specification is
rejected in this application, since u is statistically different
from 1 using a 1% level for each of the nested-logit models.
Likelihood ratio tests of this restriction yield the same
conclusion. Choosing between the charter and private mod-
els is more difficult, since one is not nested in the other.
However, since both models have the same number of
parameters, application of Pollak and Wales’ (1991) likeli-
hood dominance criterion suggests choosing the charter
model as the best representation of preferences since (for
each functional form specification) it yields a log-likelihood
value above the value obtained for the private model.
Finally, the results in table 1 provide evidence on the
statistical validity of the linear model that is typically
employed in the literature. In comparing the flexible forms
to the linear model, it is most direct to compare the GL and
linear models, since the linear model is nested within the
GL. For all three error structures, the linear model is rejected
as a restriction on the GL specification using a likelihood
ratio test statistic and a 5% significance level.18 Thus, in
general, we find that the more complex GL (and TL) model17 We investigated a third GEV distribution that grouped the beach andpier alternatives and the charter and private boat alternatives. However, the
empirical results associated with the two structures reported in the paper
dominated this structure based on both goodness-of-fit tests and consis-
tency with utility maximization criteria.
18 Note, however, that for any given error assumption, the TL models
provide slightly higher likelihood values than those from the GL model.
FIGURE 1.—ALTERNATIVE NESTING STRUCTURE
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using either of the nested-logit error structures provides a
statistically better fit of fishing mode choice when compared
to the linear MNL model. The question from a policy
perspective, however, is whether the more complex models
yield substantially different welfare predictions, i.e., differ-
ences that are worth the increased cost of computing welfare
impacts in these models. Towards this end, we turn now to a
comparison of the welfare predictions using each model
specification.
B. Welfare Estimates Using the GEV Sampler
Since the primary purpose of estimating RUMs for
recreational angling is to compute welfare measures, we
choose three different changes for which to compute welfare
impacts. First, we estimate the compensating variation that
is associated with a doubling of the price of each alternative
fishing mode. Second, we consider the compensating varia-
tion that is associated with the doubling of the catch rate at
all sites, and, third, we estimate the compensating variation
that is associated with eliminating two of the modes (pier
and beach). The latter change is also a price change, namely
one that changes the price of two of the models from their
current finite levels to infinity.
Table 2 provides estimates of the mean compensating
variation that is associated with the three changes. The per
trip welfare estimates reported in table 2 were computed
using McFadden’s GEV sampler and a search algorithm to
solve for the implicitly defined cv in equation (3). Welfare
impacts for each observation in the sample were constructed
by averaging estimated cv’s computed using T 5 1,000
iterations.19 These individual welfare impacts were then
averaged over the 1,182 observations in the sample.
Several points from table 2 are worth noting. First, the
estimated welfare effects of doubling the price of each mode
(table 2a) is relatively insensitive to the choice of functional
form and nesting structure. The welfare loss estimates range
only from 2$47.53 to 2$49.74 (the negative indicates that a
reduction in welfare occurs). Interestingly, the average price
of the four fishing modes, weighted by the original choice
probabilities, is just under $52. The proximity of this
average price to the estimated welfare changes in table 2a
suggests that the uniform doubling of prices leads to few
changes in mode choice in which case the uniformity of the
welfare estimates is not surprising. If no mode changes were
to occur, the appropriate compensating variation would
simply be this average price.
19 The choice of T 5 1,000 was selected on the basis of a Monte Carlo
experiment in which the process of estimating E(cv) using T iterations and
the linear charter model was repeated 100 times. This exercise was
conducted using various choices of T. The simulation results indicated that
the estimated mean compensated variation changed little over the 100
trials once T exceeded 500, with the standard deviation of E(cv) over the
100 trials reduced to less than $0.05 by the time T 5 1,000. Since the
charter model represents the extreme specification in terms of its departure
from the MNL model, McFadden’s simulation results suggest that the GEV
simulator would yield even more-accurate welfare predictions for the
private and MNL alternatives.
TABLE 1.—PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Functional Form
Nesting
Structure b10 b20 b11 b22 b12 u
Log
Likilihood
MNL — — 0.02** 0.95** — 1.00 21,311.98
(0.00) (0.09)
Linear Charter — — 0.01** 0.41** — 0.34a 21,235.17
(0.00) (0.10) (0.04)
Private — — 0.01** 0.85** — 0.62a 21,300.59
(0.00) (0.08) (0.06)
MNL 1.38** 1.99** 0.01* 0.47* 20.02* 1.00 21,303.91
(0.45) (0.62) (0.00) (0.23) (0.01)
Generalized Leontief Charter 1.07** 20.00 0.00 0.70** 20.01 0.31a 21,223.24
(0.26) (0.44) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.04)
Private 1.05* 0.96* 0.01* 0.67** 20.01 0.66a 21,295.28
(0.42) (0.49) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.06)
MNL 240.90** 2.05** 6.71** 0.14** 20.14** 1.00 21,297.47
(2.52) (0.37) (0.39) (0.01) (0.044)
Translog Charter 277.70** 0.44 7.37** 0.05** 20.02 0.34a 21,222.23
(16.54) (0.25) (1.24) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Private 233.24* 1.27** 5.05** 0.11** 20.06 0.64a 21,285.01
(14.25) (0.29) (0.99) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
Notes: * Statistically different from 0 at a 5% significance level.
** Statistically different from 0 at a 1% significance level.
a Statistically different from 1 at a 1% significance level.
TABLE 2.—POINT ESTIMATES OF WELFARE IMPACTS USING GEV SAMPLER
a. Doubling Prices
Nesting Structure Linear Generalized Leontief Translog
MNL 247.71 247.53 249.56
Charter 248.79 248.80 248.90
Private 248.42 248.20 249.74
b. Doubling Catch Rates
Nesting Structure Linear Generalized Leontief Translog
MNL 20.33 17.41 15.89
Charter 14.15 16.95 7.95
Private 26.79 23.72 18.83
c. Loss of Shore Modes
Nesting Structure Linear Generalized Leontief Translog
MNL 235.89 235.24 235.27
Charter 222.91 221.79 222.49
Private 230.73 230.84 228.83
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Turning to table 2b, we find that quite a different result
emerges when a doubling of catch rates is considered for
each of the modes. Substantial disparities emerge in the
welfare estimates, varying both by the functional form that is
used for the indirect utility function and by the assumed
error structure. These estimates ranges from a low of $7.95
in the case of the TL charter model to a high of $26.79 when
the linear private model is used—more than a three-fold
increase in the estimated E(cv). It is worth noting, however,
that there is at least as much variability in the welfare
predictions due to the choice of nesting structure as there is
in the form of the indirect utility function.
Finally, in the case of the loss of the shore modes (table
2c), there is very little difference among the alternative
functional forms (reading across the rows of the table), but,
again, notable differences among the error structures. For
example, given the GL functional form, the welfare impact
from losing both shore modes ranges from 2$21.79 to
2$35.24 over the alternative nesting specifications. In
contrast, given the charter nesting structure, the welfare loss
varies by little more than 5% over the alternative functional
forms, from 2$21.79 to 2$22.91.
C. Alternative Welfare Predictions
The welfare estimates for the nonlinear models presented
in table 2 were constructed using McFadden’s GEV sampler
and, hence, provide consistent estimates of the E(cv) associ-
ated with each policy scenario, given the selected functional
form and nesting structure. However, these computations are
quite costly, both in terms of the time required for an analyst
to code the algorithms and in terms of computer time.20 In
contrast, the representative-consumer approach suggested
by Morey et al. (1993) and the computable bounds in
equation (14), based on McFadden’s (1995) theoretical
bounds, are much easier to obtain. Likewise, as noted
previously, the linear model avoids the simulation problem
entirely, yielding a closed-form equation for E(cv). Given
the ease with which the linear model is estimated and the
corresponding ease with which welfare measures (and
standard errors) are computed, it may also be reasonable to
treat the estimates from the linear model as yet another
‘‘second-best’’ approach to welfare measurement. An inter-
esting empirical question is whether these simpler ap-
proaches yield substantially different welfare predictions
from those obtained in table 2. Furthermore, these simpler
approaches may be deemed even more palatable when the
statistical precision of the point estimates are considered.
Thus, if confidence intervals about the point estimates in
table 2 typically encompass the linear or representative
consumer approximations, it may be reasonable to compute
the simpler measures.
In order to shed light on this issue, figure 2 provides a
comparison of five alternative estimators of the welfare loss
due to a doubling of the catch rate.21 The first alternative is
the GEV sampler’s estimate of $16.95, indicated by the
asterisk in the top bar of the graph. The shade bar around the
asterisk represents a 95% confidence bound around the GEV
estimate, reflecting the fact that the underlying parameters
used in constructing the welfare predictions are themselves
random variables.22 Similar point estimates and confidence
bounds are provided when the welfare impacts are computed
using the linear specification and when the nonlinear model
is used, but a representative consumer approach is used to
compute the welfare changes. These represent the second
and third alternatives in figure 2. The fourth and fifth
alternative estimators correspond to the theoretical and
computable bounds given by equations (10) and (15) above.
Several results emerge from figure 2. First, in this
application, the uncertainty regarding the GEV estimate of
welfare is substantial, with the 95% confidence bound
ranging from $9 to $25, encompassing both point estimates
using the linear model and representative-consumer ap-
proaches. Second, the representative-consumer approach
closely approximates the GEV sampler estimates. Both the
point estimate of welfare ($16.51) and the confidence
bounds are within 6% of the corresponding GEV sampler
estimates. Finally, it is clear that the difficulties in computing
the upper end of McFadden’s theoretical bounds (specifi-
cally, Pk1 of equation (9) ) significantly reduces their infor-
mation content. The theoretical bounds are relatively tight
20 The calculations reported in this paper were conducted using GAUSS,
version 3.11, on a 200 MHz Pentium Pro IBM-compatible PC with 32M of
RAM. While the calculation of each point estimate in table 2 required only
15 minutes on this system, the confidence bounds reported in figures 2 and
3 each required approximately 48 hours to construct.
21 In constructing this figure, we assume that the correct model is the GL
functional form with charter nested-logit structure. The GL was chosen for
further study since it nests the linear model. An alternative to the charter
nesting structure is considered in figure 3.
22 These confidence bounds were constructed by means of simulation,
using the asymptotic distribution of the maximum likelihood parameter
estimates to reflect the uncertainty in the model coefficients. Five hundred
coefficient vectors were randomly drawn from the asymptotic distribution
of the estimates of (b,u). For each of these parameter draws, the GEV
welfare estimate of E(cv) was constructed. The 95% confidence bounds in
figure 2 reflect the middle 95% of the resulting estimates, dropping the
smallest and largest 2.5% of the values.
FIGURE 2.—ALTERNATIVE WELFARE FROM DOUBLING CATCH
RATES—CHARTER MODEL
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($15 to $18), while the alternative computable bounds are
considerably wider, only narrowing the compensating varia-
tion to lie in the range from $15 to $23. The appeal of these
computable bounds is further reduced when it is recognized
that the bounds themselves are uncertain, depending upon
the estimated parameters of the model. Confidence intervals
around the computable bounds are likely to blanket all of the
previous alternatives.
Figure 3 provides a comparable set of results when the
MNL error structure is used. The results parallel those in
figure 2. The point estimate of E(cv) for the representative
consumer approach ($17.41) is virtually identical to the
corresponding GEV sampler estimate, while the linear
model’s estimate is almost 17% larger. However, we again
find that the difference in estimating the welfare gains by
using the linear specification is swamped by the size of the
confidence intervals surrounding each of the welfare esti-
mates.
Finally, one limitation of our analysis thus far is that it has
focused attention on E(cv) averaged over the entire sample.
This narrowed focus creates two related problems. First, to
the extent that our sample is not representative of the
population of interest, this estimate of E(cv) will be mislead-
ing. At a minimum, a weighting scheme would be required.
It is not immediately clear how the alternative welfare
measures would perform in this case. Second, policy ana-
lysts are often interested not only in the aggregate welfare
impact of a program, but also in how it affects specific
segments of the population (e.g., low-income households).
The comparisons in figures 2 and 3 may mask potentially
important differences in the welfare measures predicted for
these subpopulations.
Figure 4 addresses these concerns by providing E(cv) by
income quartiles using McFadden’s GEV sampler, the
representative-consumer approximation, and the linear ap-
proximation. Here we again consider a doubling of the catch
rate for all the modes using the GL model and the
charter-nesting error structure, paralleling the results in
figure 3. Three results emerge. First, as one might expect,
E(cv) does vary by income level, starting out low at roughly
$15 per choice occasion, rising at first as income increases,
and then falling back below $15.23 Second, the representative-
consumer approximation to E(cv) continues to track closely
the GEV sample estimate, even when we focus on specific
income levels. Third, the bias in restricting preferences to be
linear in income does vary by income level. For the lowest
income quartile, all three methods yield roughly the same
welfare estimates. For the remaining quartiles, however, the
linear approximation yields welfare estimates that are 17%
to 24% smaller than the corresponding GEV sampler
estimates.
VII. Conclusions
This study has investigated the importance of nonlinear
income effects in RUMs, with particular attention to welfare
measurement. In addition to specifying a nonlinear structure
for the deterministic portion of consumer preferences, using
GL and TL models to provide flexible approximations to any
nonlinear utility function, three distinct errors structures
were considered. The resulting models were used to study
mode choice among California anglers and to compare and
contrast the available approaches for computing (or approxi-
mating) welfare changes when nonlinear income effects
exist. These approaches include a resampling scheme based
upon McFadden’s GEV sampler, a linear model, a represen-
tative-consumer approach, and the computation of bounds
on the welfare changes of interest. The approaches trade off
computational ease for potential bias in the resulting welfare
measures or uncertainty regarding their exact values.
Our analysis of California sportfishing represents, to our
knowledge, the first application of McFadden’s GEV sam-
pler. Several key empirical results emerge. First, our findings
23 One might, at first, expect that the linear model would yield the same
estimate for E(cv) for each income quartile, given that this model assumes
a constant marginal utility for both catch rates and income. However, as
income changes, so do the travel costs associated with visiting a given site
(since they depend in part on wage rates).
FIGURE 3.—ALTERNATIVE WELFARE IMPACTS FROM DOUBLING CATCH
RATES—MNL MODEL
FIGURE 4.—ALTERNATIVE WELFARE PREDICTIONS BY INCOME
QUARTILE—CHARTER MODEL
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(highlighted in table 2) suggest that, in this application, there
are more differences in the point estimates of welfare due to
changes in assumed error distribution (e.g., multinomial
logit versus nested logit) than there are due to the introduc-
tion of nonlinear income effects. Second, the consistent
welfare estimates provided by the GEV sampler are not
substantially different from the simpler linear and represen-
tative-consumer approximations, particularly when the sto-
chastic nature of the underlying parameter estimates is
considered. Finally, while the computable bounds are both
readily constructed and allow for nonlinear income effects,
they do not provide tight bounds on the welfare estimates,
even when one ignores the uncertainty of the underlying
parameter estimates. Clearly, analysts must be cautious in
drawing too strong of inferences from the results of this one
data set. First, additional empirical examples are needed to
determine the robustness of our findings. Alternatively, a
Monte Carlo analysis, investigating those characteristics of
consumer preferences that would widen the gap between the
alternative welfare estimators, would be a natural direction
for future research. However, we believe these results
provide a useful point of departure. Second, while the
differences among the welfare estimates with and without
nonlinear income effects are generally small, they may
represent a significant sum of money in actual policy
settings, making the additional effort required to employ
nonlinear specifications worthwhile in some circumstances.
In addition to providing an empirical comparison of
alternative functional forms and error structures, we have
also advanced the understanding of welfare measurement in
discrete-choice models by providing computable bounds
based on McFadden’s theoretical bounds, identifying cases
in which those bounds are uninformative, and refining the
procedures for computing the bounds themselves.
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